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Introduction
This is a review of two recent ethnographies that deal with the subject of continuity. Not in the usual sense of that term, but rather as one of the many names for the
philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, one of the founders of semiotics, of phenomenology, and of pragmatism, though he had uglier names for each of these. As he
worked on a critique of Cantor’s theory of multitudes, Peirce came to believe that
the problem of continuity was central for philosophy as well as mathematics
(Potter and Shields, 1977). Peirce’s doctrine of synechism held that ‘‘all that
exists is continuous’’ (quoted in Mladenov (2006: 29)). In a sense, this is a familiar
truism for anthropologists: apparent diﬀerences between people dissolve at a sufﬁcient level of generality, such that all seemingly isolated individuals or groups are
revealed to be part of one, dynamic totality – whether society, culture, history,
humanity, life, and/or the world. For Peirce, such ‘‘generals’’ are not unreal
abstractions, but mediate the actual manifestation of any particular. By recognizing the full-ﬂedged reality of unactualized possibilities and general tendencies,
Peirce’s continuist ontology combined monism and realism in opposition to dualism and nominalism (Noble, 1989).
In this review, I consider the potential importance of Peirce’s continuism for
anthropology through a comparison of David Pedersen’s American Value (2013,
hereafter AV) and Eduardo Kohn’s How Forest’s Think (2013, hereafter HFT).
There are many things to recommend such a comparison. Both books are based on
ethnographic research along the Paciﬁc coast of Latin America, among
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Intipuqueños of El Salvador and Runa of Ecuador, respectively. And both draw
extensively on Peirce, whose ideas they develop in conversation with Marxian value
theory and cybernetic systems theory, respectively. Both even independently coin
the phrase ‘‘open whole’’ to describe their distinct projects (AV 23; HFT 68). To
what sorts of ‘‘holism’’ do they wish anthropologists to be open? And, given their
lack of reference to each other’s work, can we, in a decidedly Peircian gesture, ﬁnd
a way to make their separate arguments continuous with one another?
Read together, Pedersen and Kohn suggest a shared theoretical project: to
dissolve the categorical divides that currently trouble anthropological theorizing
in the acid of Peircian continuity. But this common cause belies real diﬀerences
about what should be dissolved ﬁrst and what kind of ethnography should take
its place.

The open whole(s)
Early on, both authors explain their take on continuism and its relation to a distinct conception of the open whole. Strictly speaking, monism, continuism, and
holism are diﬀerent ideas, though they are often conﬂated (Dusek, 1999: 22–26).
A monist appreciation for the oneness of being might assume continua that are
more or less organized into structured wholes or wholes that are more or less
discrete and divisible. In some ways, the slippage between these diﬀerent senses
of ‘‘whole’’ accounts for the very diﬀerent ways in which Kohn and Pedersen put it
to use.
Kohn’s paradigmatic ‘‘whole’’ is symbolic language (and culture more generally)
which he characterizes as such in two senses. On the one hand, every particular
language is composed of a ‘‘contingent system of sign relations’’ (HFT 39), the
meaningfulness of which is thereby complete and self-contained from the standpoint of a speciﬁc language community and its speaker–hearers. On the other hand,
the general ability to acquire symbolic language is distinctly human and thereby
complete and self-contained from the standpoint of Homo sapiens. It is partly on
the basis of these demarcations, Kohn argues, that anthropologists have imagined
human cultures to be ‘‘wholes’’ independent, not only from each other, but also
from forms of communication found beyond the human. He proposes to ‘‘open’’
the whole of symbolic language, not to dismiss the uniqueness of humans in particular or in general, nor to reduce the startling diversity of their lifeways to mechanical drives and forces. Rather, Kohn demonstrates how the ecology of the
Amazon rainforest is not reducible to evolved instinct, but critically depends on
active sign use and interpretation (or semiosis) on the part of human and nonhuman beings.
If one begins by assuming that only humans have minds, meanings, and purpose, then it is hard to take seriously indigenous Runa discussions of what dogs
think or how the masters of the forest foretell future events in dreams. Despite what
some claim (Bessire and Bond, 2014), however, Kohn is not like others involved in
the so-called ontological turn, who allegedly seek to valorize Amerindian
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perspectivism as some kind of neo-primitive antidote to Enlightenment binaries.
The ‘‘ecology of selves’’ in the Amazon is not reliant upon Runa cosmology, rather,
the reverse is true (HFT 78). The same kind of non-symbolic signs that non-humans and humans use to communicate with and prey upon one another are also the
building blocks for the distinctly symbolic semiosis unique to humans. As an open
whole, humanity is ‘‘both distinct from and continuous with that which lies beyond
it’’ (HFT 9).
Pedersen’s holism is intended to open up space–time and not species. For him,
the real world. . .has parts, but no ultimate parts. In principle, any individual part,
anywhere and any-when, can be divided inﬁnitely. . .moving outward and backward
through all that shaped a part at any moment would lead, through inquiry without
limit, to the inﬁnite whole. (AV 22)

Pedersen criticizes the prevailing tendency to divide reality into discontinuous
chunks such as ‘‘culture’’ and ‘‘political economy’’ or ‘‘history’’ and ‘‘the present.’’
He begins his book by examining the journalistic and scholarly depiction of ‘‘The
Intipucá-DC Connection Story’’ which tends to focus on ‘‘the exclusive ties
between the [El Salvadoran] town and the DC area wrought by the decades of
migration and the exchange of wealth and ways of life across both regions’’ (AV
7). The result is a dominant narrative of American migrants and money that
divides up the hemisphere and obscures its unequal history, thereby reproducing
such inequality into the future. Rather than collect or critique such stories,
Pedersen seeks to ‘‘critically understand storytelling as a continuous, combined,
and often imbalanced geohistorical process’’ (AV 9). For this purpose, he also
relies on Peircian semiotics, not to distinguish sign types and their hierarchical
composition, as does Kohn, but to emphasize the continual development of one
sign into another and away from the initial ‘‘object’’ (i.e. the speciﬁc historical
actions and context) that inaugurated this sign process. An inquiry ‘‘without
limit’’ into the Intipucá-DC Connection Story, for example, could trace how it
has been shaped by and shapes a more encompassing context of geopolitical
relating.
Kohn does not open Runa semiosis to similarly ‘‘inﬁnite’’ hemispheric totalities,
but is concerned instead with ﬁnding a way to discuss relationships with the
Amazonian jungle – and human/nonhuman relations in general – without relying
on the categorical division of nature from culture, reducing one to the other, or
reuniting them as hyphenated hybrids, as in Latour or Haraway (much like ‘‘transnational,’’ terms like ‘‘nature-culture’’ could be said to preserve rather
than dissolve discontinuity). Pedersen may take the apparent species distinctiveness
of storytelling for granted, although he opens it to the equally radical possibilities
of an unfolding historical process without limit. Some might be tempted to categorize their open wholes as alternately ‘‘political-economic’’ or ‘‘ontological’’
(especially as discussions of the supposed ontological turn have often been
premised, in part, on alleged political or critical inadequacy). Yet both books
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engage with power and history and do so with an expanded sense of what counts as
real.

Wet theory: Abstraction and form
Peirce’s understanding of continuity evolved up to the time of his death, especially
in response to Cantorian set theory. One distinguishing feature of his approach to
continua is what Zalamea terms the ‘‘reﬂexivity’’ of their part-whole relations (as
quoted in Moore (2007: 428)). According to Peirce, there are no ‘‘ultimate parts’’
among discrete elements of a set because ‘‘every part has parts in the same sense’’
(as quoted in Moore (2007: 428)). But if everything is continuous with everything
else, the challenge becomes how to understand the relationship between the actual
evidence ethnographer’s gather and broader patterns and possibilities of which
they are a (relative) part, as well as how to account for the appearance of
discontinuity.1
The two books’ dissimilar uses of water imagery oﬀer one way to diﬀerentiate
their continuist methods. Pedersen begins his book with a quote from Italo Calvino
and a meditation on ocean waves breaking on a beach: each successive wave seems
to push others and yet is also pushed by them. He characterizes historical ethnography of the open whole as a process of looking backward and outward at evermore successive waves, thereby commencing a never-ending search for prior cause.
For Kohn the paradigmatic watery image is that of a whirlpool in a river.
Whirlpools are not reducible to the movement of water that precedes them, but
are emergent phenomena, a novel arrangement of underlying chemical and physical
components and relations.2
These watery images illustrate diﬀerent facets of continuity – the endless succession of antecedence and hierarchical emergence, respectively. If Pedersen seeks
out antecedent and encompassing conditions of possibility, Kohn decomposes alltoo-human characteristics, like language or cosmology, demonstrating how they
emerge hierarchically from the surrounding forest, thereby submitting antecedent
causes to novel arrangements of matter and mind. Both ethnographers depict continuity as a process whereby a more complicated and variable origin is reduced and
simpliﬁed into a product. This simpler product they both term ‘‘form.’’ Form is an
abstraction, but abstraction can be understood in two complementary ways, as
dissimulating or as amplifying (Rotman, 1993: 91–92). To put it very simply, one
take on abstraction looks backward at what has been lost or forgotten and one
looks forward at what is gained.
Pedersen is primarily interested in the dissimulating value forms of capitalist
social relations. In Marxian value theory, money is an abstraction that only represents a fraction of what made it possible (i.e. abstract wage labor), while concealing the concrete people, places and historical conditions behind its accretion as
capital. It is the same with Peircian signs, which continually grow in such a way
that the ‘‘immediate object’’ they represent may become more distant from the
initial, ‘‘dynamical object’’ that gave rise to the sign process (AV 14). Herein lies
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Pedersen’s crucial theoretical innovation: he depicts capitalist value as one dominant form of storytelling which represents its object (the commodity) selectively as
abstract wage labor, reﬂecting a real but highly abstract aspect of its production
(i.e. the general capacity for labor necessary for it). This results in yet another story,
the commodity’s money price, to which it tends to be reduced in capitalist
exchange. But this is not the only story possible, nor the only one told. One can
reread these dissimulating abstractions for traces of their antecedent conditions.
Such ‘‘transvaluation,’’ as Pedersen terms and practices it, is a latent potential
which allows, ‘‘for the same form or sign to shift or expand its immediate object
and therefore its meaning’’ (AV 24). Critiques of capitalism could be said to retell
familiar stories about human wealth and worth, depicting their main characters in
a new light as Das Capital did with the commodity form (see Pedersen, 2008).
Pedersen’s ethnographic present is one in which some mobile El Salvadorans are
taken to be exemplary ‘‘entrepreneurial migrants’’ whose ﬁnancial remittances
back home increasingly drive domestic and global economic policies. The real
representational tendency of capitalist value helps him to account for the partiality
of ‘‘transnational’’ stories of migration and money. A motorcycle purchased with
remittances and displayed before other Intipuqueños, a photograph of this motorcycle by a traveling journalist, an American newspaper story using this photo to
depict the transfer of wealth and prosperity from north to south. Each of these
moments are signs that represent successive developments of an object – the actual
motorcycle – itself the congealed expression of obscured totalities. By embedding
particular, fragmented stories in general habits of storytelling, Pedersen ‘‘retroductively’’ traces their development out of more than a century of interhemispheric
relationships. Unpacking each partial story, he moves continuously backward and
outward to reckon with broader geohistorical conditions of possibility, through
which north and south, rich and poor are repeatedly isolated and reiﬁed into discrete parts, the open whole disguised. In this way, Pedersen demonstrates how El
Salvadorans could historically suﬀer from the dissimulating representational tendencies of capitalist value relations, vis-à-vis the powerful north, yet continue to
invest in abstracting value forms as objects of desire and possibility. Capitalist
stories are not merely a product of concealed inequality, but they help reproduce
and spread inequalities across space and time.
In a footnote (AV 19/ﬀ 276), Pedersen brieﬂy distinguishes his approach to value
from that of David Graeber, Nancy Munn, and Terrence Turner, which he characterizes as ‘‘synchronic.’’ While the synchronic approach may be indispensible for
understanding the formation of distinctively Gawan or Kayapo value systems,
Pedersen’s more diachronic analysis is not (merely) systemic but emphasizes
value’s continuous development and spread through capitalist production and
exchange. Moreover if, for Graeber (2013), value oﬀers the best theoretical
means with which to achieve activist ends, Pedersen’s conception of transvaluation
accounts for the possibility of both theory and political action within any system of
value, not as discrete projects of engagement but as part of a continuous diachronic
series.
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For Pedersen, capitalism relies upon a general tendency or continuity that, in
theory, dissolves every distinction in the universal equivalent of the money form
yet, in practice, reproduces inequality and reiﬁes geopolitical diﬀerence. Kohn also
relies on a general, form-propagating tendency to mediate ecological relations
between the apparently discontinuous organisms of Ecuador. This form arises
not from capitalism, but from the far older (yet no less historical) Amazon rainforest, to which even capitalist extraction must occasionally defer, as did the rubber
economy of the colonial era (HFT 165). The forest thinks, Kohn proposes provocatively, and the organisms within it are nothing less than the Amazon’s (and
each other’s) living thoughts. Anthropocentrism reinscribes mechanistic visions of
a complete nature without novelty or self-ordering properties, within which culture
and life could not help but appear like miraculous exceptions. Kohn hopes to blaze
a path around these obstacles by discussing the unique sylvan historical ecology of
the Amazon, which mediates the lives of everyone, nonhumans, indigenes, and
moderns alike. Having opened the whole of symbolic language, Kohn wants to
dissolve the discrete category of ‘‘life’’ itself, which means ﬁnding examples of its
seemingly unique self-organizing properties in nonliving processes, a more encompassing nature to which it is open and upon which it relies.
If the Amazon encourages abstracting habits, it is not primarily as a force of
dissimulation, but rather ampliﬁcation. Ampliﬁcation reduces what is possible by
harnessing a speciﬁc parameter. Kohn alludes to ampliﬁcation earlier in his text,
where he explains the importance of iconic indistinction in nonsymbolic and nonhuman communication (HFT 31). An icon is the most basic sign because it involves
ignoring diﬀerences and highlighting similarities, as does a creature’s camouﬂage
when it convinces a predator to look elsewhere.
Understanding something, however provisional that understanding may be, involves
an icon. It involves a thought that is like its object. It involves an image that is a
likeness of that object. For this reason all semiosis ultimately relies on the transformation of more complex signs into icons. (HFT 51).

Common reliance on iconicity means that humans can signify in the same way as,
and in communication with, nonhuman others. For example, the distinct vocalizations of a loudly barking dog and a loudly shouting human communicate iconically
through the simple parameter of volume, present to some degree in all sounds.
A loud vocalization ampliﬁes volume so that it stands out prominently in relation
to all other vocal qualities. The important point is that, in principle, volume is
formally distinct from whatever speciﬁc meanings these vocalizations might convey.
Precisely for this reason, dogs and humans can both harness this underlying parameter in order to convey broadly similar messages (e.g. aggressive intent), which is
why humans know to be wary of loudly vocalizing canines and vice versa.
But not all contexts of communication are made equal. ‘‘Although all life is
semiotic,’’ Kohn writes, ‘‘this semiotic quality is ampliﬁed and made more apparent in the tropical forest, with its unparalleled kinds and quantities of living selves’’
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(HFT 78). Precisely because ‘‘tropical forests amplify’’ they can ‘‘make more
apparent to us, the ways life thinks’’ (HFT 78). The clearest example of form
propagation of the forest comes in Chapter 5, where Kohn discusses how the
river system propagates ecological relations that gave shape to both indigenous
cosmologies and later systems of colonial extraction. ‘‘The rubber boom economy
was able to exist and grow,’’ he argues, ‘‘because it united a series of partially
overlapping forms, such as predatory chains, plant and animal spatial conﬁgurations, and hydrographic networks, by linking the similarities they share’’ (HFT
165). These ‘‘basic regularities’’ (HFT 165) begin with the ‘‘unidirectionally nested
river pattern’’ (HFT 163) of the Amazon, which humans are not alone in harnessing for their survival. Kohn is not indiﬀerent to the violence and enslavement of the
colonial rubber regime in Ecuador, but asks only that we recognize how the indifferent forest made this possible.
So it is with the ‘‘masters of the forest’’ so central to Runa participation in the
Amazon’s emergent ecology of selves. A cosmological and all-too-human interpretation of this ecology, waking and dreamt encounters with forest masters help Runa
develop morally and practically eﬃcacious connections to the forest. But forest
masters are also only explicable through awareness of the ampliﬁcation of predatory tendencies of which they are the formal expression. Indeed, it is only by
relating indigenous cosmology to its sylvan origins, Kohn convincingly argues,
that we can understand the incorporation of colonial symbolism and history into
Runa mythopraxis.
Amazonian abstractions are unforgettable, as if implanted in the minds of all
who come into contact with them. Unlike capitalist storytelling, they needn’t conceal and disguise in order to worsen human suﬀering. But both ethnographers
appeal to the realness of these abstract forms and the general habits from which
they spring. Colonists and indigenous perspectivists are similarly reliant on formpropagating tendencies beyond any of them, whose ‘‘eﬀortless eﬃcacy’’ (HFT 21)
is hard to resist. So it is with North and South Americans involved in narrating and
directing the movement of money and people across the hemisphere. In both cases,
similarly, form (as opposed to content) plays a signiﬁcant role in constraining the
possibilities of wealth accumulation. If Kohn clariﬁes what role ‘‘nature’’ has in the
extraction of its resources, Pedersen picks up the story from that point on, tracing
how accumulated wealth reacts against its originating context as if ‘‘external to it’’
(AV 43). Kohn asks: what accounts for our having crossed a threshold into some
continuous yet new domain? And Pedersen: how and why does the new dissimulate
the old with which it is continuous?
But these accounts are not merely two halves of a continuous story. Returning
to the imagery of the wave, Kohn and Pedersen’s ethnographies of form could be
said to emphasize amplitude and wavelength, respectively. If the former takes into
account the irresistible power of existence within the wave itself, the latter focuses
on its vanishing distinction from the waves preceding and succeeding it. ‘‘This only
goes in one direction,’’ Kohn says of the hierarchical process of emergence (HFT
171). But Pedersen stresses how logical retroduction moves in two directions,
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‘‘backward and outward,’’ toward antecedent conditions of possibility. Both focus
on the real causal eﬃcacy of an unfolding dynamic. Kohn has a greater appreciation for emergence, that singular shift to a new level from the mere concatenation
of signs, where suddenly a diﬀerence makes a diﬀerence (see Rotman, 1993: 107).
Pedersen’s approach may be more transportable across varying contexts of
research, more methodologically replicable, while Kohn’s appears intentionally
rooted in the Amazon in particular. What of these discontinuities?

Discontinuities and discussion
Reading these books together, I imagine the questions the authors might ask one
another:
Pedersen: Do you not overemphasize the inﬂuence of the Amazon by selectively
amplifying Runa indigeneity, rather than the relative ‘‘modernity’’ of Some
Other Amazonians and Runa themselves (Nugent and Harris, 2004)? Why
don’t you show the historical emergence of the discrete ‘‘Amazon,’’ which surely
exists globally as a story and an abstract form in many ways you have not
explicated?
Kohn: I am also interested in the temporality of the Amazon, as a thought, but
my space–time is folded into the present, nested, in the same way the ontogenetic
development of a fetus recapitulates its phylogenetic descent. The Amazon is not
discrete, but it is an emergent real like your capitalism. The failure to realize this is
what currently endangers the ‘‘lungs of the Earth,’’ is it not?
Why don’t you ‘‘transvalue’’ the ability of human’s to tell us stories? After all,
an inﬁnite spatio-temporal continuum would surely lead us back to the very emergence of the ﬁrst story, its ﬁrst distillation of form from non-human realities.
P: The process of interpretation is inﬁnite. The point is not to go on inﬁnitely,
however, but to make choices about the continua one selects in order to undo false
and harmful discontinuities. Reading your account, one is left wondering: how
could it not have been so? Is this the best antidote to the abstraction and extraction
of the Amazon today? What has been dissimulated, what lost in how people represent trees representing water? With this take on Peirce one might recognize the
irony that capitalist value forms are now destroying the very rainforest that made
possible their emergent abstraction, as they have in Ecuador.
K: Perhaps. But your account leaves us wondering: what new stories await us?
What else could emerge? You hint, for example, that coﬀee is itself a dissimulation
of the sun’s energy (AV 69). What other than human abstractions made possible El
Salvadoran coﬀee plantations and facilitated enduring hemispheric inequalities?
Could this not represent a further condition of possibility, an amoral antecedent
to value formation?
P: Perhaps. But can your approach really be done anywhere else? I am skeptical
of your use of the Amazon as a uniquely distinct ﬁeldsite when, as Peirce shows us,
every-where must be continuous with many-wheres.
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Here I will stop this exercise, not to give my imaginary Pedersen the last word,
but because I hope that it is clear what both approaches can and might still add to
one another, not in violation of their continuist ethos but as a further development
of it.
Some of the contrasts I have magniﬁed for the sake of explication are unfair.
Pedersen’s account is also ‘‘nonhuman’’ insofar as all-too-human creations like
value and money price take on a vampiric life of their own. And perhaps an
emphasis on nonhuman forms becomes less important as forest is cut down for
farms? El Salvador has lost a greater percentage of its primary rainforest than
almost any country in Latin America, after all. But, in fact, Kohn’s exploration
of nonhuman webs is no more exhaustive than Pedersen’s impossibly inﬁnite
endeavor. Consider what the former says about the uniqueness of the Amazon,
for example:
The interrelations among so many diﬀerent semiotic life-forms in this dense ecology of
selves result in a relatively more nuanced and exhaustive overall representation of the
surrounding environment when compared to the way life represents elsewhere on the
planet. That is, the ‘‘thoughts’’ of a tropical forest come to represent the world in a
relatively more detailed way. (HFT 81)

Could the same not also be said about terrestrial life in general? After all, there is
arguably greater ecological density beyond the ocean depths, on land, where to
survive unsuspended organisms had to develop intricate new forms of predation
and parasitism (see McMenamin and McMenamin, 1996). Perhaps the surface of
the earth is, in general, a good ﬁeldsite for an anthropology of the nonhuman.
Some would undoubtedly characterize Pedersen’s as the more ‘‘political’’ of the
two books, due to its application of Marxian analyses of capitalism. Like Eric Wolf
and Fernando Coronil, Pedersen reminds anthropologists of the political consequences of the all-but-compulsory methodological decision to choose a singular
‘‘ﬁeldsite,’’ which presupposes a privileged divide of ﬁeld from study and conveniently renders the lives of the site’s inhabitants as discretely located in time and
space. At the same time, Pedersen further demonstrates how much can be gained
by dissolving the enduring scholarly distinction between the really political and the
merely cultural. Indeed, no worthwhile account or critique of capital can ignore the
coproduction of stores and stories of value.
Kohn writes just as much about the nightmarish weight of dead generations,
moreover. Both ethnographers seem to recognize death as apparent discontinuity
at its most palpable, objectiﬁcation into the ultimate other (‘‘dead meat’’ as Runa
say). For Pedersen, the suﬀering of the living and the dead is evident in stories of
persecution and poverty, but is often misrepresented or silenced as part of national
storytelling. Among Runa, Kohn explains, the dead are part of the ecology of
selves, just as killing is a critical practice of (non)relating. Human continuity
with the no longer living is here linked to continuity of an ‘‘I’’ with an ‘‘us’’
(HFT 196). Indeed, El Salvadoran dead could be seen in a similar way, as an
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emergent ecology of selves that continue to weigh down history. But, not all
Ecuadoran dead are so ampliﬁed. The Runa ecology of spirits does not seem to
include slain and enslaved Hoarani, neighbors and enemies to the Runa, for
instance. If Hoarani do not become masters of the forest, as do Runa kith and
kin, this might indicate the dissimulating side of the Runa cosmology of relating, a
more general ‘‘us’’ that has not yet become.
It is also true that Kohn oﬀers new avenues for the critique of capitalism. In an
earlier passage, he describes a moment of anxiety brought about by one particularly unsettling sojourn to his ﬁeldsite and a lack of connection to his fellow travelers. He associates the detachment and panic he felt with symbolic language and
its apparent closure, which appeared to be the case when he availed himself of
nonsymbolic forms of communication to recover from his experience. As he writes,
‘‘symbolic thought run wild can make us experience ‘ourselves’ as set apart from
everything: our social contexts, the environments in which we live, and ultimately
even our desires and dreams’’ (HFT 50). Could one not characterize the real representational tendency of capitalist value as precisely ‘‘symbolic thought run wild,’’
which would explain the individualist greed it seems to foster? In this sense, contemporary neoliberalism would seem to represent a political expression of the
anxious solipsism that aﬄicted Kohn. Like Kohn, William Connolly (2013) also
draws on the work of Terrence Deacon, but he does so precisely in order to criticize
neoliberal ideology, which tends to assume that only markets possess self-organizing tendencies. In order to do so, Connolly focuses on stories of humankind and
self-organization passed on by neoliberal thinkers like Hayek. He thus shows, in a
way similar to Pedersen, how neoliberal storytelling selectively (mis)represents its
objects.

Conclusion
Unlike similarly ambitious 19th century philosophies (Husserl’s, for example),
there remains a kind of playful joy associated with drawing upon the Peircian
corpus, as if it could be developed in any direction for any purpose. In some
ways, this speaks to the breadth and constant growth of Peirce’s ideas during his
lifetime, but it is also arguably a consequence of there being no Heidegger and
Derrida to Peirce’s Husserl, that is, no established tradition of exegetical destruction and deconstruction to make American anthropologists as skeptical of pragmatism as they are of presence (but see Hacking, 2007). For three decades –
roughly from Silverstein (1976) to Keane (2007) – Peircian anthropologists have
continually felt the need to reexplain to their audiences the diﬀerence between
Peircian sign and Saussurean signiﬁer, as well as the deﬁnitions of icon, index,
and symbol. Thirty years of teaching readers how to count to three before one
can begin an argument! And yet, rather than see this as an unfortunate symptom of
continued neglect of Peirce’s writings, one could claim that this is precisely what
makes Peirce an attractive interlocutor for so many. No stodgy Derrida has interfered with anthropological play and dissemination, which means that Peirce’s ideas
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can be reinterpreted again and again as alternately Saussurean, Heideggerian,
Jakobsonian, Latourian, cybernetic, or Marxian.
By drawing on Peirce’s continuist thinking, Pedersen and Kohn are not just
adding two new reinterpretations to the mix but are appealing to the very core
of Peircian ontology. More importantly, they do so at a time when interest in
dissolution of categorical divides is widespread. But Pedersen and Kohn also
show how diﬀerently this demand can be met. Continuity means that seemingly
opposed categories like human/nonhuman are understood as part of more encompassing processes, an expanded ‘‘us’’ (HFT 68). Continuity also means that seemingly distant places and times are actually wound together as part of more
encompassing storytelling habits, an expanded when and where. That is, continuity
from place to place and moment to moment, as opposed to continuity between
distinct levels of emergence. But this formal relationship between the texts belies
the independent power of their ethnographic analyses, their invitation to imagine
novel continuities, of space–time, of kind, which open up methodological possibilities in turn. Both Pedersen and Kohn are diﬃcult to pin down and span various
disciplinary divides, but they share an interest in the reality of general patterns, not
the obfuscating appeal of ‘‘irreducible complexity’’ (HFT 19) or ‘‘random chaos’’
(AV 23). In a line that could have appeared in either book, Kohn writes, ‘‘complexity, context, and entanglement can themselves become the objects of ethnographic analysis rather than the unquestioned conditions for it’’ (HFT 14).
But continuism, rigorously applied, can make any analysis start to appear like
that which it is not (and from which it is only ever relatively distinct in the ﬁrst
place). Continual storytelling places objects under erasure, focusing on their representation through chains of semiosis. The retroductive ‘‘opening’’ of stories
makes them vanish into an inﬁnite spatio-temporal horizon, just as antecedent
waves eventually begin to melt into the whole of the ocean. And yet, by the end
of Pedersen’s book the transvaluation of previous stories brings with it the possibility of novel change, emergence. By the end of Kohn’s book, conversely, emergence is so well accounted for that the eﬀortless eﬃcacy of form seems almost like a
forgone conclusion, a fulﬁllment of an antecedent cause and not something new. I
point out these seeming paradoxes for the same reason I have placed these texts
into conversation, because for me their ideas are very much alive and, as Peirce said
of all symbols, should continue to grow.
Notes
1. Though not explicitly in conversation with Peircian philosophy, Strathern (1991) uses the
model of ‘‘Cantor’s dust’’ in a related way in order to complicate anthropological tropes
of comparison.
2. Tim Ingold also uses water as a fluid metaphor for the relational becoming of living
creatures: ‘‘We could regard the organism. . .as a kind of eddy or whirl. . .endlessly creating itself in the current of life, just as the water of a stream, without any kind of template
or central direction, forms itself into ripples, droplets and vortices’’ (2013: 18). Terrence
Deacon, like Kohn, uses the spontaneous emergence of whirlpools to illustrate form
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propagation (2012: 255). However, Deacon is careful to distinguish nonbiological morphodynamic processes from evolved teleodynamics consisting of ‘‘the capacity for
self-repair and self-replication’’ (2012: 270). The continuation of a virtual, living ‘‘self,’’
formally distinguishable from all its repairs and replications, is why organisms and environments can mix so thoroughly without completely dissolving into each other, at least
until teleodynamics give way to death.
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